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Abstract. In this paper we study how to characterize ethical agents in norma-
tive multi-agent systems. We adopt a proposition control game together with in-
put/output logic. Norms create the normative status of strategies. Agents’ prefer-
ence in proposition control games are changed by the normative status of strate-
gies. We distinguish four ethical types of agents: moral, amoral, negatively im-
partial and positively impartial. Agents of different ethical types use different
input/output systems and different procedures to change their preference. Prefer-
ence changes induce normative proposition control games and notions like nor-
mative Nash equilibrium are then introduced. We study some complexity issues
related to normative reasoning/status and normative Nash equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Norms prominently affected agent’s behavior by creating obligations and permissions.
Different agents have different reactions when there are conflicts between their obliga-
tions and preference. Intuitively, it seems acceptable that:
– A moral agent will consider fulfilling obligations to be more important that maxi-
mizing preference.
– An amoral agent will act in accordance with his preference and ignore obligations.
– An impartial agent will first classify his actions into legal and illegal categories ac-
cording to norms, then rank his actions using preference within the two categories.
Based on such intuition, our main research concern in this paper is to answer the
following question: “How to formally characterize different ethical types of agents?”
This research question is understood in the setting of normative multi-agent system.
Normative multi-agent system [3] is a new interdisciplinary academic area developed in
recent years bringing together researchers from multi-agent system [16], deontic logic
[8] and normative system [1, 11, 2]. In this paper we adopt a proposition control game
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together with input/output logic. Proposition control game, as a variant of Boolean game
[10, 4], is a class of games based on propositional logic. Input/output logic [12] appears
as one of the new achievements in deontic logic in recent years [8].
Norms are social rules regulating agents’ behavior by prescribing which actions are
obligatory, forbidden or permitted. [15]’s early work on behavior change under norms
has considered only a relatively simple view of norms, where some actions or states are
designated as violations. [2] studies how conditional norms regulate agents’ behaviors,
but permissive norms plays no role in their framework. In this paper, agents’ behavior
are regulated by conditional norms including permissive norms.
In the proposition control game theoretical setting, norms classify strategies as
moral, legal or illegal. Such classification transforms the game by changing the prefer-
ence relation in the proposition control game. To represent norms in proposition control
games, we make use of input/output logic. The preference relation in proposition con-
trol games are changed by the normative status of strategies. Agents of different ethical
types use different input/output logic for normative reasoning and have different pro-
cedures of preference change. The input/output logic and the procedure of preference
change characterizes different types of ethical agents.
The structure of this paper is the following: we present some background knowledge
on proposition control game and input/output logic in Section 2. Normative status and
ethical agents are introduced and its complexity issues are studied in Section 3 and 4.
We summarize and conclude this paper with future work in Section 5.
2 Proposition control game and input/output logic
2.1 Proposition control game
Proposition control game is a variant of Boolean game. Boolean game is super succinct
in the sense that agents’ strategy and utility function are represented implicitly. Such
succinctness is reached with a cost: many decision problems in Boolean games are
intractable. For example deciding whether there is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
in a given Boolean game is ΣP2 hard [5]. To find a balance between succinctness and
tractability, we introduce proposition control game.
In a proposition control game, the strategies available to each agent consist in as-
signing a truth value to each variable he can control. The goal of each agent is repre-
sented by a set of weighted formulas. Formally, let P = {p0, p1, . . .} be a finite set
of propositional variables and let LP be the propositional language built from P. 2P is
the set of all valuations for P, with the usual convention that for V ∈ 2P and p ∈ V ,
V gives the value true to p if p ∈ V and false otherwise. Let X ⊆ P, 2X is the set
of X-valuations. A partial valuation (for P) is an X-valuation for some X ⊆ P. Par-
tial valuations are denoted by listing all variables of X , with a “ + ” symbol when the
variable is set to be true and a “− ” symbol when the variable is set to be false: for in-
stance, letX = {p, q, r}, then theX-valuation V = {p, r} is denoted {+p,−q,+r}. If
{P1, . . . ,Pn} is a partition of P and V1, . . . , Vn are partial valuations, where Vi ∈ 2Pi ,
(V1, . . . , Vn) denotes the valuation V1 ∪ . . . ∪ Vn.
Definition 1 (proposition control game). A proposition control game is a tuple
(Agent,P, pi, S1, . . . , Sn, Goal), where
1. Agent = {1, . . . , n} is a set of agents.
2. P is a finite set of propositional variables.
3. pi : Agent 7→ 2P is a control assignment function such that {pi(1), . . . , pi(n)} forms
a partition of P.
4. For each agent i, Si ⊆ 2pi(i) is his strategy set.
5. Goal = {Goal1, . . . , Goaln} is a set of weighted formulas of LP. Each Goali is
a finite set {〈x1,m1〉, . . . , 〈xk,mk〉} where xj ∈ LP and mj is a real number
representing the weight of xj .
A strategy for agent i is a pi(i)−valuation. Note that since {pi(1), . . . , pi(n)} forms
a partition of P, a strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) is a valuation for P. Agents’
utilities are induced by their goals. For every agent i and every strategy profile s,
ui(s) = Σ{mj : 〈φj ,mj〉 ∈ Goali, s  φj}. Agent’s preference over strategy pro-
files is induced by his utility function: s ≤i s′ iff ui(s) ≤ ui(s′). Let s = (s1, . . . , sn)
be a strategy profile, we use s−i to denote the projection of s on Agent − {i}: s−i =
(s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn) and si to denote the projection of s on i’s strategy.
In a proposition control game, an agent’s strategy set is a subset of the power set
of the propositional variables he can control. This is why proposition control game are
computational easier than Boolean game. For the sake of tractability, we sacrifice the
super-succinctness of Boolean game and use proposition control game instead.
Example 1 LetG = (Agent,P, pi, S1, S2, Goal)whereAgent= {1, 2}, P = {p, q, r, s},
pi(1) = {p, r}, pi(2) = {q, s}, S1 = {{p, r}, {p}, {r}}, S2 = {{q, s}, {q}, {s}},
Goal1 = {〈p↔ q, 1〉, 〈s, 2〉}, Goal2 = {〈p ∧ q, 2〉, 〈¬s, 1〉}. This is depicted as:
+q,+s +q,−s −q,+s
+p,+r (3, 2) (1, 3) (2, 0)
−p,+r (2, 0) (0, 1) (3, 0)
+p,−r (3, 2) (1, 3) (2, 0)
2.2 Input/output logic
In I/O logic, a norm is an ordered pair of formulas (a, x) ∈ LP × LP. Two types of
norms are used in I/O logic, obligatory norms and permissive norms. An obligatory
norm (a, x) ∈ O is read as “given a, x is obligatory”. A permissive norm (a, x) ∈ P
is read as “given a, x is permitted”. We further assume obligatory norms are attached
with a priority relation ≥, which is reflexive, transitive and total. (a, x) ≥ (a′, x′) is
understood as (a, x) has higher priority than (a′, x′). We further extend the priority
relation to permissive norms: every permissive norm has the same priority and it is
strictly lower than any obligatory norm. We call N = (O,P,≥) a normative system.
Obligatory norms O can be viewed as a function from 2LP to 2LP such that for a
set A of formulas, O(A) = {x ∈ LP : (a, x) ∈ O for some a ∈ A}. [12] define the
semantics of I/O logic from out1 to out4 for obligatory norms as follows:
– out1(O,A) = Cn(O(Cn(A))).
– out2(O,A) =
⋂{Cn(O(V )) : A ⊆ V, V is complete}.
– out3(O,A) =
⋂{Cn(O(B)) : A ⊆ B = Cn(B) ⊇ O(B)}.
– out4(O,A) =
⋂{Cn(O(V )) : A ⊆ V ⊇ O(V ), V is complete}.
Cn is the classical consequence operator of propositional logic, and a set of for-
mulas is complete if it is either maximal consistent or equal to LP. I/O logic is given a
proof theoretic characterization. An ordered pair of formulas is derivable from a set O
iff (a, x) is in the least set that extends O ∪ {(>,>)} and is closed under a number of
derivation rules. The following are the rules used by [12] to define out1 to out4:
– SI (strengthening the input): from (a, x) to (b, x) whenever b ` a.
– WO (weakening the output): from (a, x) to (a, y) whenever x ` y.
– AND (conjunction of the output): from (a, x) and (a, y) to (a, x ∧ y).
– OR (disjunction of input): from (a, x) and (b, x) to (a ∨ b, x).
– CT (cumulative transitivity): from (a, x) and (a ∧ x, y) to (a, y).
The derivation system based on the rules SI, WO and AND is called deriv1. Adding OR
to deriv1 gives deriv2. Adding CT to deriv1 gives deriv3. The five rules together give
deriv4. In [12], x ∈ outi(O, a) iff (a, x) ∈ derivi(O), for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} is proven.
[14] introduces a formation of prioritized I/O logic. In [14]’s, the priority relation
over norms is lifted to priority over sets of norms. [14] uses the lifting originally intro-
duced by [6]: O1  O2 iff for all (a2, x2) ∈ O2−O1 there is (a1, x1) ∈ O1−O2 such
that (a1, x1) ≥ (a2, x2). Let N = (O,P,≥) be a normative system and A,C be two
sets of formulas. [14] define prioritized I/O logic as follows: for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4},
x ∈ outpi (O≥, A,C) iff x ∈
⋂{outi(O′, A,C) : O′ ∈ preffamilydi (O≥, A,C)}.
Here preffamilydi (O
≥, A,C) is defined via the following steps:
1. maxfamilyi(O,A,C) = {O′ ⊆ O : outi(O′, A)∪C is consistent, and outi(O′′, A)
∪C is not consistent, for every O′ ( O′′}.
2. filterfamilyi(O≥, A,C) is the set of norms O′ ∈ maxfamilyi(O,A,C) that
maximize the output, i.e., that are such that outi(O′, A) ( outi(O′′, A) for no
O′′ ∈ maxfamilyi(O,A,C).
3. preffamilyi(O≥, A,C) is the set of-maximal elements of filterfamilyi(O,A,C).
4. preffamilydi (O
≥, A,C) is the set of elements O′ of preffamilyi(O≥, A,C)
stripped of all the pairs (a, x) such that outi(O′, A) = outi(O′ − {(a, x)}, A).
We simplify [14]’s prioritized I/O logic as follows:
Definition 2.
x ∈ outpi (O≥, A,C) iff x ∈
⋂{outi(O′, A) : O′ ∈ preffamilyi(O≥, A,C)}.
Here preffamilyi(O≥, A,C) is defined via the following two steps:
1. maxfamilyi(O,A,C) is the same as in [14]’s definition.
2. preffamilyi(O≥, A,C) is the set of-maximal elements ofmaxfamilyi(O≥, A,C).
We drop preffamilydi because our main concern is whether a formula x is in
outpi (O
≥, A,C), preffamilydi has no effect on whether x ∈ outpi (O≥, A,C). We use
the following example to illustrate why we delete filterfamilyi.
Example 2 Let O = {(f, d), (d, a)} where f means I have fever, d denotes that I go
to my doctor, and a means I make an appointment with him. Let (d, a) > (f, d). Put
A = {f ∧ ¬a} and C = A. Intuitively, I should go to an hospital and not to my doctor.
Using [14]’s original definition, we have d ∈ outp3(O≥, A,C), which prescribes me to
go to my doctor without an appointment. Such behavior fulfills a lower obligation (f, d)
meanwhile creates a violation of a higher obligation (d, a). Using our simplified defini-
tion, we have d 6∈ outp3(O≥, A,C), which gives more socially acceptable prescription.
In the setting of prioritized normative system, we choose negative and static positive
permission from [13] and reformulate them as follows:
Definition 3. Given a normative system N = (O,P,≥) and a set of input A,
1. NegPermi(N,A) = {x ∈ LP : ¬x 6∈ outpi (O≥, A, ∅)}.
2. – IfP 6= ∅, then StaPermi(N,A) = {x ∈ LP : x ∈ outpi ((O∪{(a′, x′)})≥, A, ∅),
for some (a′, x′) ∈ P}.
– If P = ∅, then StaPermi(N,A) = outpi (O≥, A, ∅).
We consider amoral agents as willing to commit as less obligations as possible. We
choose the weakest out1 to be the logic for amoral agents. Moral agents tends to accepts
those slightly debatable rules of normative reasoning. We choose out4 to be the logic
for moral agents. Negatively/positively impartial agents classify actions according to
whether they are negatively/positively permitted. Since the rule OR involves uncertainty
and vagueness, out2 seems to be not suitable for positively impartial agents. Thus, we
choose out3 for positively impartial agents and out2 for negatively impartial agents.
3 Normative status
We use a proposition control game to represent a multi-agent system.
Definition 4 (normative multi-agent system). A normative multiagent system is a tu-
ple (G,N,E, ρ) where
– G = (Agent,P, pi, S1, . . . , Sn, Goal) is a proposition control game.
– N = (O,P,≥) is a finite normative system.
– E ⊆ LP is the environment, which is a finite set of formulas representing facts.
– ρ : Agent 7→ {1, 2, 3, 4} is an agent type assignment function which assigns each
agent a unique ethical type.
Strategies are classified as moral, positively legal, negatively legal or illegal.
Definition 5 (moral, legal and illegal strategy). Given a normative multi-agent sys-
tem (G,N,E, ρ), a strategy (+p1, . . . ,+pm,−q1, . . . ,−qn) is:
– moral: if p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pm ∧ ¬q1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬qn ∈ outpk(O≥, E, ∅).
– positively legal: if p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pm ∧ ¬q1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬qn ∈ StaPermk(N,E).
– negatively legal: if p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pm ∧ ¬q1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬qn ∈ NegPermk(N,E).
– illegal: if ¬(p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pm ∧ ¬q1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬qn) ∈ outpk(O≥, E, ∅).
Example 3 Let (G,N,E, ρ) be a normative multi-agent system as follows:
– G = (Agent,P, S1, S2, pi,Goal) is a proposition control game with
• Agent = {1, 2}, P = {p, q},
• pi(1) = {p}, pi(2) = {q}, S1 = {{p}, ∅}, S2 = {{q}, ∅},
• Goal1 = {〈p ∧ q, 1〉}, Goal2 = {〈p ∨ q, 1〉},
– N = (O,P,≥) where O = {(>, p)}, P = {(>, q)}, ≥= ∅.
– E = ∅, and both 1 and 2 are type-1 agents.
+q −q
+p (1, 1) (0, 1)
−p (0, 1) (0, 0)
out1(O,E)=Cn({p})=outp1(O≥, E, ∅), StaPerm1(N,E)=Cn({p, q}). The norma-
tive status of +p,+q,−q,−p is respectively moral, positively/negatively legal, illegal.
Having defined the normative status of strategies, we now study the complexity of
some decision problems related to normative reasoning and normative status.
Theorem 1. Given a normative multi-agent system (G,N,E, ρ), deciding whether a
type-k agent strategy (+p1, . . . , +pm,−q1, . . . ,−qn), is moral is Πp2 complete.
Corollary 1. Given a normative multi-agent system (G,N,E, ρ), a type-k agent and
his strategy (+p1, . . . , +pm,−q1, . . . ,−qn),
1. deciding whether this strategy is illegal is Πp2 complete.
2. deciding whether this strategy is negatively legal is Σp2 complete.
Theorem 2. Given a normative multi-agent system (G,N,E, ρ), a type-k agent and
his strategy (+p1, . . . ,+pm,−q1, . . . ,−qn) deciding whether this strategy is positively
legal is Πp2 complete.
Corollary 2. Given a normative multi-agent system (G,N,E, ρ), a type-k agent and
his strategy (+p1, . . . ,+pm,−q1, . . . ,−qn), deciding the normative status of (+p1, . . . ,
+pm,−q1, . . . ,−qn) is Σp2 hard and in ∆p3 =PΣ
p
2 .
4 Ethical agents
Different types of agents change their preference in different ways. Informally:
1. Amoral agents prefer strategy profiles with higher utility; for two profiles of the
same utility, the one containing the strategy of higher normative status is preferred.
2. Moral agents prefer strategy profiles containing the strategy of higher normative
status; for two profiles of the same status, the with higher utility is preferred.
3. Negatively impartial agents classify strategies into negatively legal category and
illegal category; then they rank the strategies using utility within the two categories.
4. Positively impartial agents classify strategies into positively and not-positevely le-
gal category; then they rank the strategies using utility within the two categories.
Given a normative multi-agent system, it induces a normative proposition control
game by changing the preference of agents.
Definition 6 (normative proposition control game). Given a normative multi-agent
system (G,N,E, ρ) where G = (Agent,P, pi, S1, . . . , Sn, Goal), it induces a norma-
tive proposition control game GN = (Agent,P, pi, S1, . . . , Sn,≺1, . . . ≺n) where ≺i
is the preference of i over strategy profiles such that
1. if i is type-1 (amoral), then s ≺i s′ if
– ui(s) < ui(s′), or
– ui(s) = ui(s′) and the normative status of s′i is higher than that of si.
2. if i is type-2 (negatively impartial), then s ≺i s′ if
– si is illegal (not negatively legal) and s′i is negatively legal, or
– both si and s′i are illegal and ui(s) < ui(s′), or
– both si and s′i are negatively legal and ui(s) < ui(s′).
3. if i is type-3 (positively impartial), then s ≺i s′ if
– si is not positively legal and s′i is positively legal, or
– both si and s′i are not positively legal and ui(s) < ui(s′), or
– both si and s′i are positively legal and ui(s) < ui(s′).
4. if i is type-4 (moral), then s ≺i s′ if
– the normative status of s′i is higher than that of si, or
– the normative status of s′i is equal to si and ui(s) < ui(s′).
Theorem 3. Given a normative multi-agent system (G,N,E, ρ), an agent i and two
strategy profiles s and s′, deciding whether s ≺i s′ is in ∆p3.
Definition 7 (normative Nash equilibrium). Given a normative multi-agent system
(G,N,E, ρ), a strategy profile s is a normative Nash equilibrium if it is a Nash equi-
librium in the normative proposition control game GN .
Theorem 4. Given a normative multi-agent system (G,N,E, ρ) and a strategy profile
s, deciding whether s is normative Nash equilibrium is in ∆p3.
5 Conclusion and future work
In this paper we adopt a proposition control game and I/O logic approach to normative
multi-agent systems. We distinguish four ethical types of agents, which use different I/O
logic for normative reasoning and different procedures to change their preference. Such
preference change create normative proposition control games and notions like norma-
tive Nash equilibrium are then introduced. We study some complexity issues related to
normative reasoning/status and normative Nash equilibrium.
The contribution of this paper is twofold: on the conceptual side, we give a for-
mal characterization of four ethical types of agents. On the technical side, we present
some complexity results of normative reasoning with respect to prioritized I/O logic.
All the complexity results in this paper are intractable, we leave it as future work to find
tractable fragments. We conjecture that if we restrict every formula that appears in I/O
logic to be a conjunction of literals, then all decision problems studied in this paper is
tractable. Such restricted prioritized I/O logic has similar expressive power to the logic
of abstract normative systems [7], as well as defeasible deontic logic [9]. A detailed
comparison between these logic is also left as future work.
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